FIELDS OF CLASSIC DIPLOMACY WITH WHICH DEFENCE DIPLOMACY INTERACTS HORIZONTALLY. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this paper is to identify, on the one hand, the common aspects of defence diplomacy and two fields of classic diplomacy, namely preventive and coercive diplomacy, and the elements that distinguish them, on the other hand. Defence diplomacy is a field currently experiencing a rapid growth and, unfortunately, many times it is confused with coercive or preventive diplomacy. That is why the goals pursued by defence diplomacy are misperceived, both by certain political and military decision-makers and by public opinion.

KEYWORDS: defence diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, preventive diplomacy

1. Introduction
In the contemporary security environment, defence diplomacy is becoming an important instrument in the process of preserving international security, given the stimulation of international actors to communicate and negotiate instead of initiating violent acts. Although a series of modern procedures and methods for using diplomacy in different situations of crisis are being implemented, it is worth taking into account the idea expressed by Frederick the Great, who stated that: “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments” [1]. This idea outlines the need for a pragmatic approach from states that have understood, by and large, that possessing armed forces with a great fighting power will become an argument taken into consideration by discussion partners in the framework of diplomatic negotiations, thus helping the state possessing them to have a say in the equation of international relations.

In the contemporary security environment, the role of defence diplomacy is to manage military forces of states from a diplomatic point of view, in the sense that defence diplomacy must accurately predict the moment when the idea of the possibility to engage military forces can be induced in diplomatic negotiations, in order to achieve a strategic objective or a national interest of a state.

2. Converging Aspects of Defence Diplomacy and Preventive Diplomacy
Converging aspects of defence diplomacy and preventive diplomacy
mostly arise from the definition of the two concepts and especially from the fact that the two types of diplomacy, both falling within the scope of classic diplomacy, focus to a great extent on “trust” and “early warning”, which are interpreted and implemented differently by each of them.

In the paper called “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992”, an official definition of preventive diplomacy can be identified, namely: “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” [2]. The same document also mentions that preventive diplomacy: “requires measures to create confidence, it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding and it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones” [3].

The most important feature common to preventive and defence diplomacy is the fostering of a climate of “trust among states”, and, in terms of specific goals, it can be noticed that defence diplomacy, through its operationalisation process, is designed to build “trust” so that preventive diplomacy can take it over, after it has already been developed or in the process of being developed, and use it in its undertakings or its conflict prevention process.

It takes a lot of time to build this confidence; more precisely, a series of clearly established historical events are taken into consideration, which, after an objective assessment, can lead to the conclusion that a certain state is trustworthy. At the same time, building and maintaining trust between two states in relation to the mutual respect of their national interests could generate situations in which one of the parties might be disappointed.

In the contemporary security environment, despite the fact that states realised they are closely connected in terms of security and interdependent regarding their capacity of response to threats, they sometimes behave in a selfish manner, finding immoral justifications in order to obtain great, but short-term profits, even to the detriment of losing stable partners.

Trust is hard to earn; it takes time and great efforts; most times, it is advisable for a state not to change “over night” the alliance it entered into or its attitude towards an international event. The predictability of foreign and defence policy of a state can be considered to be the most appropriate feature to induce the feeling of trust to a certain partner.

Defence diplomacy, through the wide range of activities it promotes and through which it is actually put into practice, aims to promote trust among states. Cooperation and partnership relations among states would be devoid of substance without “trust”. Alliances formed among sovereign states are the result of defence diplomacy, which was able to create the platform on which states can develop trust in order to cooperate at political and military levels and set up a regulatory mechanism (treaties, strategic concepts, strategies, regulations, directives, provisions, orders, documents related to internal management), but also at operational level (headquarters, fighting units, support units and logistic support units).

In order for a state to be accepted as member of an alliance, it must earn the trust of each of its members, proving its capacity to observe both the rules set by the alliance (including the Treaty establishing the alliance, that needs to meet citizens’ support, expressed by free vote within a referendum, in tandem with the ratification of the respective treaty by the national Parliament) and the efficiency standards of military staff and of the technique adopted by the states that are already members. There are situations in which “trust” is
earned by doing favours, but this considerably erodes the functioning of the respective alliance (a suitable example can be the situation in which a state that wants to be integrated into an interstate organisation is suggested to purchase a series of military equipment from the states that are already members in order to win their good will and vote of approval).

In the contemporary security environment, in order for a state to be credible and build a capital of trust, it needs:

- to align its domestic legislation with the provisions of public international law;
- to respect a series of human rights and freedoms (right to life, right to freedom of opinion and expression, property right, freedom of movement);
- to comply with the treaties and agreements it already ratified;
- to have implemented a reform of the army that resulted in the improvement of this system;
- to participate with military forces in the operations deployed by the alliance, including military drills and exercises;
- to refrain from an aggressive, expansionist and anti-democratic foreign policy;
- to comply with international agreements concerning arms reduction, the neutralisation of weapons of mass-destruction and nuclear non-proliferation.

Some of the above-mentioned requirements are achieved by means of defence diplomacy; to be more specific, all the elements related to the negotiation of treaties and agreements, the assistance and advice received from other countries which are more experienced in the field of army reformation, the participation in the negotiation of and the subsequent compliance with arms reduction treaties, the participation in exercises and drills conducted jointly by various states can be considered to be activities that fall within the scope of responsibility of defence diplomacy and their role is to encourage earning trust, while preventing slippages in the behaviour of states, which can cause significant prejudice to the preservation of regional security.

Certain states ruled by a totalitarian regime are viewed with distrust by neighbouring countries and even by the international community if they were proved to pursue a policy of excessive arming, to finance nuclear proliferation and to carry out unreasonably intense informative activities.

Any state that does not meet a set of minimum requirements, so that the neighbouring countries or the international community regard it as a state with peaceful intentions, may be a subject of interest for preventive diplomacy, whose clear role is to prevent a conflict without using force or threats with the use of force.

The discontinuation of diplomatic relations between two states, mutual withdrawal of diplomats and of defence, military, air and navel attachés, the discontinuation of trade relations (exports and imports of military equipment, armaments, fuel) of military relations (military exercises, joint military drills, exchanges of trainees) automatically triggers preventive diplomacy, since these are among the first signs that the functioning of defence diplomacy failed and that, without any specific measures taken by preventive diplomacy, the escalation into a conflict becomes imminent.

Regarding “early warning”, referred to at the beginning of this sub-chapter as one of the needs of preventive diplomacy, it can be also achieved by means of defence diplomacy, under certain circumstances. One of the main tasks of defence, military air, navel attachés, who are essentially one of the most important instruments by which defence diplomacy is operationalised, is to understand social, military and political-military realities in the states where they carry out their activity, to understand the foreign and defence policy of a state, its national interests, to identify its friends and enemies and to timely identify its hostile
intentions towards a neighbouring or nearby country, this way managing to ensure the “early warning” of decision-makers in the country that sent them and, in turn, these decision-makers are able to inform intergovernmental organisations in which the respective state is a member and even the United Nations Organisation. After having benefited from this “early warning”, preventive diplomacy can develop its algorithm of stages necessary to prevent the emergence of a crisis or even of a conflict. “Early warning” is a stage that plays the most important role within preventive diplomacy since it is cheaper and easier to prevent a conflict that to seek solutions to end it after it has started.

In conclusion, the most important converging elements of defence and preventive diplomacy are the fact that both types of diplomacy are promoted in order to maintain peace, they use “trust” to avoid conflict escalation, they use “early warning” to be able to counter the emergence of conflicts and they both promote the friendly settlement of disputes.

3. Converging Aspects of Defence Diplomacy and Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy is a manner of tackling issues related to the change of behaviour of a state or non-state actor, by using a series of methods to persuade it that starting a conflict can have very serious consequences on it. These methods include: the threat to use force; exposing, in the most realistic manner possible, the impact that the use of force will have on it and its population and economy; exposing the disadvantages of starting a conflict caused by it or in which it is involved; exposing human and material costs incurred by not giving up its violent intentions.

Robert Jeffrey Art defined coercive diplomacy in the book “The United States and Coercive Diplomacy” as follows: “coercive diplomacy has two attributes: it seeks to get a target to change its behaviour through the threat to use force or through the use of limited force” [4].

The common feature of defence diplomacy and coercive diplomacy is the military instrument, namely they both use the army to achieve their goals. The significant difference between the two types of diplomacy is that, while defence diplomacy focuses on preparing armed forces to fight, coercive diplomacy does not refrain from the threat to use force and sometimes even from using force, in order to achieve certain political goals.

Defence diplomacy significantly focuses on human resources policies, on acquiring military technology and conducting joint military exercises and drills between partner states, in order to train its human resources and standardise the action procedures. The human resources in the army are one of the greatest and most important concerns of political and military decision-makers who operationalise defence diplomacy (an idea resulting from the identification of efforts made to specialise and upgrade the skills of the military staff, through training courses, with a view to achieve all types of missions, ranging from war-fighting missions to peacekeeping missions).

Defence diplomacy is deeply rooted in reality and does not exclude the fact that, at a certain point, force can be used to achieve political objectives, but it is not as concerned with this matter as it is with promoting cooperation among states in the fields of military education and training, exchanges of trainees, cooperation in the areas of scientific research, military engineering and military equipment manufacturing industry.

Through the series of actions putting it into effect, coercive diplomacy can be considered to be the beneficiary of the efforts and results obtained following the operationalisation of defence diplomacy. If the latter is concerned with training and professionalising the human resources
within a state military organisation, coercive diplomacy is concerned with the use, as efficiently as possible, of these resources in order to achieve its desiderata.

One of the actions included by coercive diplomacy is the demonstrative use of force [5]. This “demonstration of force” can be achieved through a large-scale military drill [in this case, an appropriate example could be the anti-terrorist military drill “Peace Mission 2010” organised by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September 2010, in which 5000 military men took part and which was based on tactical scenarios to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism [6] in which more states can participate, which makes possible the identification of a certain “cooperation or coordination” between coercive diplomacy, which can be interpreted as being the beneficiary of the “demonstration of force”, and defence diplomacy, by means of which this military drill was held, being the platform that facilitated meetings and negotiations among political and military decision-makers from various states.

Another common denominator of defence diplomacy and coercive diplomacy is the use of a concept relevant for the two types of diplomacy, namely “persuasion”. This “persuasion” is generated by the defensive intentions of states that intelligently use the instruments of power they possess. Defence diplomacy uses “persuasion” in order to form alliances, coalitions and partnerships, explaining to states how useful cooperation in the field of defence is and how much regional and international security can be preserved if various states pool their military facilities, proving that, by acting together, they can obtain a real comfort of security, to the detriment of individual action. Coercive diplomacy can use “persuasion” in defensive purposes [7], by deliberately threatening to use force in order to persuade a state or non-state actor that clearly displays its aggressive intentions to give up this type of intentions and the violent actions it planned to take, before it suffers notable losses.

The concern of coercive diplomacy with eliminating or neutralising the danger of starting a conflict, threatening with the rational and controlled use of force, becomes unfounded if the state or group of states initiating it does not possess a credible military force, visibly larger than the entity considered to have violent tendencies.

Another notion used by the two types of diplomacy, but in a totally different manner, is the concept of “threat”. While defence diplomacy strives to counter “threats” by developing inter-state dialogue, promoting the creation of alliances, concluding agreements and partnerships meant to interconnect the defence systems of states, coercive diplomacy uses the “threat” as the fundamental element underlying it, in the sense that it expresses and manifests itself by using “threats”.

4. Conclusions
Taking into account the elements presented above, defence diplomacy, preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy can be considered to pursue the same goal, namely preventing the emergence or escalation of conflicts among states. The method used to achieve this result is different since the instruments and the action scheme used by the three types of diplomacy are different. While preventive diplomacy seeks to build a certain level of trust among states, coercive diplomacy is based on threat as a strategy.

Although preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy are two branches of general diplomacy that have specialised in different attitudes, approaches and methods of taking action (in the sense that preventive diplomacy has a “softer” approach, while coercive diplomacy has a “harder” approach), neither of them can
express themselves individually in international relations. One cannot talk about preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy in general terms, without a field of reference. That is why they are conducted and they are even accessed in the framework of wider and better defined fields of interest. For example, the two types of diplomacy, preventive and coercive diplomacy, are used in the framework of economic diplomacy when a series of instruments related to economic flows, embargos, legislation, additional taxation for products from a certain geographical area are involved.

When preventive and coercive diplomacy use instruments falling within the scope of fields of interest such as regional and international security or even defence, they can become, depending on the context, instruments (if it is not an overstatement) of defence diplomacy, while creating an interdependence between the way in which these three types of diplomacy function and the goals whose achievement is ensured by them.

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